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THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL:
THE ETHICS OF NEGOTIATIONS
WITH A STATE THAT ROUTINELY
VIOLATES ITS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
David S. Jonas*
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of negotiations, the Iran Deal (the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action ("JCPOA"))1 has been a contentious
topic: the subject of debate over both the decisions to accept the deal and
to negotiate it in the first place. Iran's history of pushing boundaries with
its nuclear program raised serious principle and pragmatic concerns
about even pursuing such an agreement. To allay these concerns, the
Obama Administration set forth several red lines over which it would
not negotiate.' The deal that resulted, however, crossed several of those
red lines.
This Article argues that entering into negotiations was proper, as
were the initial red lines set forth by the Obama Administration. 3
However, the decision to accept the resulting agreement, with radical
deviations from those red lines, was unjustified, setting a dangerous
precedent almost guaranteed to result in further nuclear weapons
proliferation. To that end, this Article discusses: (1) Iran's obligations
and its noncompliance-focusing particularly on Iran's safeguards
* David S. Jonas is a partner at FH+H, a D.C. area law firm. He served as General Counsel
of the National Nuclear Security Administration and of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
A retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, he also served as nuclear nonproliferation planner for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He teaches Nuclear Nonproliferation Law & Policy at Georgetown and George
Washington University Law Schools and has also taught that subject at the U.S. Naval War College.
Elizabeth Urrutia, during her time as a student at the George Washington University Law School,
has provided exceptional writing and research assistance in preparing this Article.
1. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP'T ST. (July 14, 2015)
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA].
2. Teresa Welsh, Did the US. and Iran Get What They Wanted Out of the Iran Deal?, U.S.
NEWS (July 15, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/15/how-do-the-red-lines-inthe-final-iran-nuclear-deal-compare.
3. See infra Part ul.
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obligations and its duty to provide accurate information to the
International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"); 4 and (2) the propriety of
negotiating and accepting an agreement with a state that violates its
international obligations. 5
II. OBLIGATIONS AND VIOLATIONS

Iran is a party to four legally binding international agreements
relating to nuclear nonproliferation: The Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty ("NPT"), 6 a safeguards agreement with the IAEA,7 the UN
Charter,8 and the Genocide Convention.9 The first two agreements relate
directly to nuclear nonproliferation, while the second two agreements
relate tangentially.' ° This Part summarizes Iran's obligations and
behavior under each of these agreements.
A. NPT
The first of Iran's obligations arise from its status as a party to the
NPT. Iran became a non-nuclear weapons state ("NNWS") party to the
NPT in 1970.11 As a NNWS, Iran is prohibited from producing or
acquiring nuclear weapons, from exercising control over nuclear
weapons, or from seeking assistance in the manufacture of such
weapons. 12 NNWSs retain the right, however, to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. 13
Iran had already engaged in nuclear research and uranium
enrichment for several years by the time it became a party to the treaty. 14
Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s under the Atoms for Peace
Program and progressed steadily into the 1970s. 1'5 Iran lost its support
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part HIl.
6. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
7. Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA-Iran, June 19, 1973, 954 U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter
Safeguards Agreement].
8. U.N. Charter art. 2, 4.
9. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
280 U.N.T.S. 1021 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
10. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2, 4; Genocide Convention, supra note 9; NPT, supra
note 6; Safeguards Agreement, supra note 7.
11. NPT, supra note 6, at 169.
12. Id. art. H.
13. Id. art. IV. Significantly, "peaceful uses" is ambiguously defined in Article IV. Id.
14.

Greg Bruno, Iran's Nuclear Program, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 10, 2010),

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-nuclear-program.
15. Id.
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from that program in the late 1970s after concerns arose over the Iranian
Revolution and Iran's nuclear ambitions. 6 Iran nonetheless continued
developing its nuclear capability. 17 The nature and the extent of Iran's
nuclear program remains unclear.1 8 Iran consistently denies pursuing a
nuclear weapon-maintaining that uranium enrichment is merely an
exercise of its NPT right to the benefits of civil nuclear energy.19
Whether Iran's nuclear activity after the 1970s, specifically
uranium enrichment, constitutes an NPT violation is debatable. Indeed,
the NPT neither explicitly prohibits nor expressly entitles NNWSs to all
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including indigenous enrichment
and reprocessing ("ENR"). 20 The United States' position has historically21
been that the NPT guarantees NNWSs no right to ENR.
Nonetheless, the issue is a continuing matter of contention among parties
to the treaty.22
Iran may not have violated the NPT technically or legally, but it has
almost certainly violated the spirit of the treaty. Iran's lack of
transparency and begrudging cooperation, as well as the "possible
military dimensions" of its program, are at the very least inconsistent
with its obligations under the NPT.23
B. Agreements with the JAEA
Iran's second set of obligations arise from its legally binding
safeguards agreement with the JAEA. Under Article III of the NPT,
NNWSs must conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to verify
the fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty and to ensure the
strictly peaceful nature of their nuclear activity.24 Iran entered into a

16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18.
19.

Id.
Peter S. Green, Iran Says It Has 'Inalienable Right' to Enrich Uranium, BLOOMBERG

(June 29, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artices/2012-06-29/iran-says-it-has-inalienableright-to-enrich-uranium.
20. Id.
21.

Elias Groll, Did the United States Just Grant Iran the Right to Enrich Uranium, FOREIGN

POL'Y (Nov. 24, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/24/did-the-united-states-just-grant-iranthe-right-to-enrich-uranium.
22. Gary Samore, Nuclear Rights and Wrongs: Why One Legal Term Stalled Negotiations
with Iran, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-

east/2013- 11 -14/nuclear-rights-and-wrongs.
23. See Implementation of the NPT SafeguardsAgreement andRelevant Provisionsof
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA (Nov. 23, 2016),

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov20lO-62.pdf.
24.

NPT, supra note 6, art. HI.
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safeguards agreement with the IAEA in May 1974.5 In doing so, Iran
undertook to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material within its
territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control. To that end, Iran is
obliged to provide accurate information "concerning nuclear material
subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities
relevant to safeguarding such material. 26
The JAEA suspected Iranian noncompliance with the safeguards
agreement in the early 2000s. 27 Following allegations of undeclared
nuclear activities, the IAEA initiated an investigation into Iran's nuclear
program. 8 Through that investigation, the IAEA identified multiple
instances of Iran's failure to comply with its legally binding obligations
under its safeguards agreement, specifically those regarding the
reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that
material, and the declaration of facilities where such material was stored
and processed. 9 In 2006, the IAEA reported Iran to the UN Security
Council for noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.3 °
C. United Nations Charter
The IAEA report resulted in a third set of obligations, which dealt
with Iran's status as a member of the UN. After the JAEA's report in
2006, the UN Security Council ("UNSC") passed several resolutions
("UNSCR"): UNSCRs 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008), 1887 (2009), and 1929 (2010).31 These resolutions called on Iran
to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities,
suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a
25. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 7.
26. Id., art. VIII.
27.

Implementation of the NPT SafeguardsAgreement in the Islamic Republic ofIran, IAEA

(June 6, 2003), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-40.pdf
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Director General, Remarks at Conclusion of IAEA Board Meeting (Mar. 8, 2006)
(transcript available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisories/transcript-of-directorgenerals-remarks-at-conclusion-of-iaea-board-meeting-8-march-2006).
The IAEA has limited
ability to address noncompliance other than to report it to the Security Council. See STAT. IAEA
(Oct. 23, 1956) (describing the process in Articles III and VIII. The statute was amended three
times, and the lasted amendment is December 28, 1989). Other countries reported to the Security
Council for noncompliance include Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. The Safeguards
System of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, KENT C. L. B.1, I http://www.kentlaw.edu/

faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSpO9/TheSafeguardsSystemoftheIAEA.pdf

(last

visited

Feb. 3,

2019); see also Trevor Findlay, IAEA Noncompliance Reporting and the Iran Case, ARMS

CONTROL ASS'N (Jan./Feb. 2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_0102/Features/IAEANoncompliance-Reporting-and-the-Iran-Case.
31.

Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against,

with 1 Abstention, U.N. (June 9, 2010), https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm.
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heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional
Protocol. The UNSC adopted most of these resolutions under Chapter
many of their provisions legally binding
VII of the UN Charter, making
32
member.
UN
a
as
upon Iran
Iran systematically violated these UNSCRs. Claiming a right to
uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes, Iran rejected the UNSCRs as
invalid and refused to observe them.33 The Iranian government further
promised to reject any resolution or treaty that punished it for its nuclear
34
activities or infringed on its perceived right to uranium enrichment.
The UNSC imposed sanctions on Iran for its failure to comply with the
resolutions. Following the conclusion of the Iran Deal negotiations, the
UNSC granted relief from those sanctions.35
D. Genocide Convention
As a UN member state, Iran must also adhere to the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
("Genocide Convention").36 This Convention, though less frequently
discussed in the nuclear nonproliferation realm, is worth mentioning
briefly here. Under the Convention, inciting genocide against a group of
people, as Iran does against the people of Israel, is an illegal act.3 7 These
threats are more concerning given Iran's violations of its other
nonproliferation obligations and its departure from international norms.
Iran's stated desire to use nuclear weapons to destroy Israel further
complicates negotiations and reaching a nonproliferation agreement.38
By the time JCPOA negotiations began, Iran had already
disregarded applicable and legally binding UNSCRs, violated its
safeguards agreement in contravention of international law, violated the
spirit of the NPT, and threatened the population of another state with the

32. See U.N. Charter ch. VIII; David Jonas, International Law vs. the Iranian Nuclear
Negotiations: Setting a Dangerous Precedent, WAR ON ROCKS (May 18, 2015),
http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/international-law-vs-the-iranian-nuclear-negotiations-setting-adangerous-precedent.
33. Christine Hauser, Iran Vows to Ignore UN Resolution, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2006),
=
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/world/africa/07iht-iran.html?_r 0.
34. Id.
35. Sonini Sengupta, U.N. Moves to Lift Iran Sanctions After Nuclear Deal, Setting Up a
Clash in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/
world/riddleeast/security-council-following-iran-nuclear-pact-votes-to-lift-sanctions.html.
36. Genocide Convention, supra note 9.
37. Id. art. I11(c); Robert Bernstein, Irwin Cotler & Stuart Robinowitz, Inciting Genocide Is
a Crime, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2012, at A15.
38. See, e.g., Iran Threatens to "Raze" Israeli Cities in Nuclear Standoff, CBS NEWS (Mar.
21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-threatens-to-raze-israeli-cities-in-nuclear-standff.
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use of nuclear weapons.39 Thus, it is within that context that we
consider the ethics of choosing to negotiate with Iran and accepting the
resulting agreement.
III. ETHICAL ANALYSIS
The United States, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
Germany (the P5+1), as well as the European Union, pursued
negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program and ultimately
reached an agreement on July 14, 2015.40 Given Iran's past
transgressions, the P5+1's willingness to engage in negotiations was a
matter of ethical concern, as was the P5+1's acceptance of the final
agreement. This Part discusses those concerns.4 1
A. The Decision to Negotiate
The decision even to negotiate with a state like Iran poses its own
ethical dilemma, forcing states to decide between "negotiating with
terrorists" and foregoing potentially fruitful talks.42 Iran, labeled part of
the "Axis of Evil" by the Bush Administration, behaves with
indifference toward accepted international norms.43 Considered a rogue
state by much of the world, Iran supports terrorism, disregards human
rights, deceives the international community, and violates its
international legal obligations. Such a state should arguably be denied
the privilege of interacting with the international community as other
states would." The international community and the United States will
sometimes eliminate negotiations as an option to resolve conflicts with
such states.4 5 Just engaging in negotiations with a state like Iran seems to
legitimize or reward rogue behavior.' Iran received a seat at the table
with the P5+1 (consisting of all the major world powers), which was a

39. See, e.g., Sengupta, supranote 35.
40. JCPOA, supra note 1.
41. See infra Part IfI.A-B.
42. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2015, DEP'T OF ST. 300-01 (June 2016).
43. See Bertram I. Spencer, Negotiating with Villains Revisited: Research Note, 8 INT'L
NEGOTIATION 613 (2003); President George W. Bush, The President's State of the Union Address
(Jan. 29, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/200201291i.html.
44. Spencer, supra note 43, at 614-16.
45. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, supra note 43. See
generally Spencer, supra note 43.
46. Spencer, supra note 43, at 616-17.
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reward in and of itself.47 For this reason, the United States had an ethical
interest in refusing to negotiate.
On the other hand, the United States was perhaps obliged to
negotiate-particularly given the alternatives. 48 The alternatives to
negotiation with Iran included military action, increasing sanctions, or
doing nothing and waiting for Iran to concede or build nuclear
weapons. 49 Even without the options of more desirable alternatives,
some would go so far as to say that there exists a moral duty to attempt
negotiations unless doing so is impossible.5" Ethically, there seems to be
little to lose by entering into negotiations, particularly when the
administration promulgates clearly delineated red lines. Concluding
negotiations with an agreement like the JCPOA, however, and ignoring
one's own red lines to do so, raises different ethical concerns.
B. The Decision to Accept an Agreement
The P5+1 and Iran concluded the JCPOA on July 14, 2015. Under
the JCPOA, Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium,
limit the number and sophistication of its centrifuges, and restrict
uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent. 5' Regarding heavy-water and
reprocessing, Iran agreed to convert the Arak facility and refrain from
building any new heavy-water facilities for fifteen years. Iran also
agreed to grant the LAEA regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities in
order to monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement.52
To that end, Iran agreed to apply provisionally the Additional
Protocol allowing JAEA enhanced access to Iranian sites. In return,
the P5+1 promised relief from U.S., European Union, and UNSC
nuclear-related sanctions. 3
To conclude this deal, the United States deviated significantly from
its own red lines. The United States allowed Iran to continue enriching
uranium, even if only within certain constraints. Iranian nuclear plants
47. Official Proposals on the IranianNuclearIssue, 2003-2013, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N (July
2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran Nuclear-Proposals.
48. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal (Aug. 5,
2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarkspresident-iran-nuclear-deal).
49. Spencer, supranote 43, at 615-17.
50. G. Richard Shell, The Morality of BargainingIdentity Versus Interest in Negotiation with
Evil, 26 NEGOTIATION J. 453, 458-61, 469-73 (2010).
51. David Jonas, Five Reasons Why the Iran Nuclear DealIs Still a Really BadIdea, WAR ON
RocKs (Oct. 14, 2015), http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/five-reasons-why-the-iran-nuclear-dealis-still-a-really-bad-idea.
52. Id.
53. See id; Jonas, supra note 32.
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remain open and Iran continues its nuclear program. By agreeing to
these terms, the United States contradicted decades of consistent,
bipartisan U.S. nonproliferation policy, and its previously held position
that the NPT includes no right to ENR for NNWSs.1 4 This agreement
announces to the world that it is acceptable for Iran to enrich uranium, a
right the United States has denied many allies.55 The JCPOA, which
specifically authorizes Iranian enrichment, arguably resolves for all
states, intentionally or not, the dispute over the guarantees in the NPT in
favor of an indigenous right to enrich.5 6
The deal also required the alteration of existing UNSCRs and the
sanctions they imposed. 7 Iran ignored Security Council mandates, yet
the JCPOA legitimizes its noncompliance. 8 "Indeed, the JCPOA
constitutes an initial legal authorization for Iran to abrogate all existing
Security Council resolutions prohibiting it from enriching uranium."59
The deal sets a precedent for disregarding Security Council Resolutions
and weakens both the nonproliferation regime and the effectiveness of
future UNSCRs.6 °
Even if the administration had maintained its red lines, the JCPOA
is a non-binding political commitment that may be changed or
terminated at any time. 6 1 Political commitments, when made by a state
that will observe them, can be quite valuable. 62 The United States, for
example, typically treats its political commitments as it does its legally
binding obligations-as most Western states do. 63 Had the deal been
made with Switzerland, there would not be cause for concern. But the
JCPOA was not made with Switzerland or the Vatican; it was made with
Iran-a state with a history of breaking its commitments by maintaining
secret nuclear sites, threatening a UN member state's existence,
engaging in terrorism, producing intercontinental ballistic missiles,
violating its legally binding safeguards agreement, and withholding
information from the IAEA. Iran, which disregards even legally binding
obligations, will not be constrained by a mere political commitment.'

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Jonas, supra note 51.
Id.
Id.
Jonas, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jonas, supra note 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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If Iran's past behavior was not enough to raise ethical
considerations about agreeing to the terms of the JCPOA, Iran's
behavior during negotiations should have been. Even as talks
progressed, Iran remained fundamentally hostile to the United States and
to the idea of adhering to international obligations. Iran continued
referring to the United States as the "Great Satan."65 Iran also launched
missiles near American warships.6 6 Just days before implementation of
the JCPOA, Iran took hostage two U.S. Navy boats and ten U.S. Navy
67
sailors and released videos of the sailors surrendering to Iranian forces.
Iran continued this behavior even after signing the JCPOA, performing
ballistic missile tests clearly intended to threaten Israel and engaging in a
series of naval provocations with the United States.68
Crossing our own red lines to reach this agreement with Iran, given
its history and continued violation of its international obligations is
imprudent and unjustified. It sets a dangerous precedent that encourages
further nuclear weapons proliferation and the flouting of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime and international law. Other states will now
desire indigenous ENR, and if many regional states believe that Iran is
about to obtain nuclear weapons, those states will procure them also.
Furthermore, it now appears that the administration conceded more
to Iran than previously thought. In September 2016, a well-respected
think tank, the Institute for Science and International Security, issued a
report stating that secret exceptions were created to allow Iran to exceed
limits set by the actual agreement. 69 Not only did the administration
concede to Iran's demands, it did so in an unethically nontransparent
way--obscuring the extent to which it crossed its own red lines and
preventing proper oversight.
65.

Thomas Erdbrink, Hard-Liners' Attacks on U.S. Hint at a Struggle in Theran, N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015, at A10, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/world/middleeast/us-remainsthe-great-satan-hard-liners-in-iran-say.html? r-0.
66. Ken Chamberlain & Lance M. Bacon, Navy: Video Shows IranianRockets Launched near
Truman,

other

Warships,

MARINE

CoRps

TIMES

(Jan.

9,

2016),

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2016/01/09/navy-video-shows-iranian-rocketslaunched-near-truman-other-warships/78554342.
67.

David Larter, U.S. Navy Rebukes Iran After Propaganda Video Shows Sailors Crying,

NAVY TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/02/10/iran-imagesriverine-crying-strong-condemnation-navy/80186322.
68.

See Colum Lynch, Washington Made it Easy for Iran to Fire its Ballistic Missiles,

FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 15, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/washington-made-it-easyfor-iran-to-fire-its-ballistic-missiles; see also Barbara Starr & Olivia Beavers, Iran Escalates High
Seas Harassmentof US Navy, CNN (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/06/politics/iranus-navy-confrontation.
69. David Albright & Andrea Stricker, JCPOA Exemptions Revealed, INST. SC. & INTN'L
SEC. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/JCPOAExempt
ionsRevealed_1 Sept20l6_Final1.pdf.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Iran's historical failure to adhere to its obligations makes
negotiating and reaching an agreement an ethical dilemma. Ultimately, it
is hard to argue that negotiations were not worth a try. Negotiation was
perhaps the least unpleasant of several undesirable alternatives. The
morality and wisdom of negotiating with Iran are debatable. But while
the process of obtaining the agreement with Iran may or may not be
objectionable, the outcome surely was. By crossing our own red lines
and granting nearly all of Iran's demands, the agreement has set a
dangerous precedent for other states to follow and weakened
international law, the UN Security Council, and the NPT.
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